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The European Forum, set up in 1992 by the High Council, is a Centre 
for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence. 
Its aim is to bring together in a given academic year high-level experts 
on a particular theme, giving prominence to international, comparative 
and interdisciplinary aspects of the subject It furthers the co-ordina­
tion and comparison of research in seminars, round-tables and confer­
ences attended by Forum members and invited experts, as well as 
teachers and researchers of the Institute. Its research proceedings are 
published through articles in specialist journals, a thematic yearbook 
and EUI Working Papers.
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1997-98 
European Forum programme on ‘International Migrations: Geography, 
Politics and Culture in Europe and Beyond’, directed by Professors 
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Policies towards non-nationals stand at the crossroads between the principle of 
national sovereignty whereby states can decide who enters and exits their 
territory and human rights norms that constrain the actions of states in liberal 
states.1 As Leah Haus has pointed out, “migration is relevant for those 
interested in exploring possible transformations in state sovereignty.”2 Recent 
academic work on the rights of foreigners in Europe has emphasized the 
existence of a post-national discourse on membership in Europe that operates at 
the transnational level and challenges national policy efforts to control 
migration flows and curtail migrant rights.3
What is the impact of norms enacted by international organizations on the 
rights of foreigners in contemporary Western Europe? In this article, I trace the 
process of incorporation of European Court of Human Rights and European 
Court of justice legal norms in the jurisprudence and policies regarding aliens in 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands in the postwar period. Resident aliens in 
European receiving countries have seen their legal status improve since the 
1970s, in spite of the restrictive goals of migration policy after the first oil 
shock and an adverse political climate brought about by socioeconomic 
restructuring and the rise of anti-immigrant parties. Foreigners were allowed to 
bring in their families, they enjoy a more secure residence status, and better 
guarantees against expulsion. Moreover, they have gained access to civil, 
political, and social rights that had been previously reserved for nationals.4 
When trying to account for the betterment of the status of non-nationals, there is 
at least one reason to seek an explanation at the international or European level: 
albeit in varying degrees and at different speeds, similar changes in foreigners' 
rights occurred across European states regardless of their respective 
immigration histories, traditions of incorporation, or nationality laws,5 thereby 
suggesting that a supra-national dynamic was at work.
1 Habermas 1994.
2 Haus 1995, 285.
3 See in particular Soysal 1993, 1994, 1997; Sassen 1996; Jacobson 1996. They concur to 
some extent with scholars who call for the development of a substantive European citizenship 
that would be distinct from citizenship in one of the member states of the European Union. 
For current debates on European citizenship, and issues of participation, see, for instance 
Wiener 1997. For an assessment of these debates, see Weiler 1996b and Favell 1997b.
4 For a description of these changes, see Brubaker 1989; Layton-Henry 1990; Hammar 1990; 
Soysal 1994; Freeman 1995; Guiraudon 1997, 1998a.
5 For cross-national studies on immigration, citizenship, and migrant incorporation policies in 
Europe, see Hammar 1985; Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994; Ireland: 1994, Hollifield: 1992; 




























































































I examine a number of norms at the supranational level likely to have 
weighed on domestic improvements of the status of foreigners. Each time, I ask 
the following queries: How far do they go in affirming the rights of non­
nationals? Did they motivate national policy decisions or jurisprudence? If so, 
when, in which countries, and through which mechanisms? The answers are 
based on the analysis of international legal texts, national and European court 
records, as well as on interviews with judges, policymakers, human rights and 
pro-migrant activists and the scanning of immigration debates and official 
documents for references to international standards.
I call the norms analyzed here “international” and distinguish them from 
national ones for two main reasons. First, the European Convention of Human 
Rights was adopted in 1950 in particular circumstances: the beginning of the 
Cold War when the United States used its status as a hegemon in the West to 
pressure Western European nations into developing instruments to bolster 
democratic and liberal values. Moreover, the Convention’s draft was finalized 
by a multinational committee of experts. It is interpreted by an independent 
group of judges from the different signatory states in such a way that neither the 
Convention nor its jurisprudence can be said to equate with a particular national 
bill of rights or legal vision. Furthermore, I examine specifically the norms that 
emerge through the decisions of a multinational college of judges on the (equal) 
treatment of aliens. They are parallel to the development of national 
jurisprudence and laws but the latter cannot be said to causally affect the former 
nor can the jurisprudence be said to be dominated by one particular national 
legal culture.6
The framework and findings presented in this article seek to contribute to 
three debates in international relations theory. The first debate regards 
intemational/domestic linkages and is relevant to our understanding on the 
current state of state sovereignty.7 The second academic discussion regards the 
capacity of international organizations to affect domestic policy outcomes. The 
now vast literature on international organizations has mainly sought to 
understand why states (principals) delegate authority to international 
organizations (agents). By studying the ways in which Council of Europe and 
European Union courts try to bear on the policies of signatory states, I ask 
whether there is a fit or a gap between state interests and the influence of the 
courts.
The third one concerns the ways in which we can measure the unmediated 
effect of international norms on the policies of nation-states and, if so, how?
6 On the history of the creation of the Council of Europe, the European Convention and 
European Court of Human Rights, see Bitsch 1997.




























































































Scholarly interest in norms understood as collective understandings of 
appropriate behavior re-emerged in the late 1980s as a legitimate competitor to 
interest-based, or power-based explanations in international relations8 at the 
same time as historical institutionalists in comparative politics were exploring 
anew the role of ideas and paradigm shifts to explain policy variations.9 There is 
still room for debate as to “which norms matter”10 and under what conditions. 
As Albert Yee recently underlined, analysts of the effects of ideas on policies 
have not responded convincingly to scholars who deny their existence because 
they do not specify policy resultants precisely, do not differentiate between 
various types of ideas and beliefs and, more importantly, need to establish 
clearly the causal link between the two.11 The elaboration of testable hypotheses 
on the independent role of norms calls for a clear specification of the 
micromechanisms whereby norms emerge, are diffused, and transform existing 
practices.
Before laying out the research design chosen for this study, I discuss 
ways of conceptualizing the principled beliefs that are likely to influence 
policies towards aliens and I review the debate on the import of international 
normative constraints within the field of immigration and citizenship studies. In 
the first part of the article, 1 examine the jurisprudence of European Court of 
Human Rights on aliens’ rights and its national cooptation. In the second part, I 
discuss another possible international source of norms diffusion, namely the 
European Court of Justice. Finally, I examine one possible explanation for the 
limited impact of human rights norms on aliens’ rights, namely the deficiencies 
of a transnational issue network (involving European Union and subnational 
level actors and other countries such as neighbouring states or sending countries 
of immigration). The general findings of the empirical research presented here 
are that (a) a well-established norms protecting aliens does not exist in Europe, 
(b) the international jurisprudence that has developed in limited areas has been 
incorporated varyingly by different countries and (c) domestic constitutions 
provide stronger tools to protect the rights of non-nationals than international 
conventions.
8 In particular, see Axelrod and Keohane 1986, 229; Jervis 1988, 317-319; Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Lumsdaine 1993; Me Elroy 1992; Klotz 1995; Tomson 































































































In the discussion on the role of norms, some international relations theorists 
have engaged in a debate with organizational sociologists and drawn from their 
concept of institutionalized norm. The sociology literature is particularly 
relevant to the discussion of aliens’ rights since one of the major comparative 
studies on the issue has been written by Yasemin Soysal, an institutionalist and 
a sociologist.12 For sociologists like John Meyer, norms and rules are not 
structures of incentives and constraints which determine the calculus of actors 
but rather function as templates for behavior as in the case of routines, standards 
of appropriateness, cultural symbols and cognitive schema.13 The latter enable 
actors to find solutions to their problems by providing cues and scripts as to 
what constitutes legitimate forms of action.14 Strategies of action emerge from 
a process whereby shared models of appropriate action are constructed socially 
and diffused through the organizational environment.15 This theory sparked 
interest in political science as a means of challenging approaches that conceive 
of political decisions as driven by the cost-benefit calculus of self-interested 
actors.16
The theoretical underpinnings of the Stanford-based school speak directly 
to international relations theory. Organizational sociologists contend that 
external cultural legitimacy rather than functional needs explains most 
organizational behavior. This external culture spreading around the globe is, in 
fact, Western culture, and Western-type rationality. Among the artefacts that it 
has created: the organization of the world into bureaucratic states who value 
individualism and expanding notions of individual rights.17 John Boli’s work 
shows, for example, that citizenship rights have evolved in a coordinated way 
over the last century so that the pattern of rights expansion (e.g. when women 
voted or welfare rights were codified) in a particular state does not correlate 
with local conditions but with the international cultural norms about rights at 
the time the constitution was written.18
The research generated has taken the form of event history analyses, and 
quantitative studies that include many states across time and look for signs of
Global norms: theoretical insights from sociology and their limitations
12 Soysal 1994. See the next section for further discussion of her argument.
13 See Thomas et al. 1987. For a review of new institutionalisms, including organizational 
sociology, see Hall and Taylor 1994.
14 Powell 1990.
15 Scott and Meyer 1994.
16Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996.





























































































isomorphism. This type of research agenda and methodology has certain 
limitations. First, “detailed process-tracing and case study analyses to validate 
and elaborate the inferences based on correlation are missing.”19 Second, it first 
underestimated cross-national variation although more recent studies seem to 
take it into account.20 Recent studies on the propagation of transnational ideas 
have all highlighted the ways in which national structures influence their 
domestic infiltration to create significantly different outcomes.21 Kathryn 
Sikkink's study on human rights policy in Europe and the US has demonstrated 
that, in spite of a similar international normative commitment, the time at which 
human rights became important and the nature of the policies which they 
generated were very different.22 Even when there is a shift in international 
discourse, national variations in its adoption abound partly because of resistance 
and conflict that organizational sociologists do not dwell on. In this paper, I 
seek to pay particular attention to these two missing elements: process-tracing 
and cross-national differences in norms adoption.
In order to do so, it is fruitful to study a "critical case" as is the case of 
post-war Europe. The post-war period saw the multiplication of international 
human rights declarations such as the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights under the auspices of the United Nations. Yet, as Kathryn 
Sikkink reminds us, only in Europe were steps quickly taken to “translate the 
human rights ideals of the declarations (...) into widely shared understandings 
and practices.”23 In particular, as part of democratic reconstruction and 
European integration, an unprecedented system of monitoring and enforcement 
of human rights norms was set up. The 1950 European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms came into force in 
1953 and the European Court of Human Rights -the first international 
jurisdiction of human rights protection in history whose decisions are binding 
on signatory states- started functioning in 1959. Between 1959 and 1993 
(inclusive), the Court ruled on 447 cases and this number is rapidly growing. In 
fact, the number of appeals has risen so dramatically (there were 5000 cases 
registered in 1989 for example) and the length of procedures become so long 
(five years) that a reform of the system was decided at the Vienna summit in 
1993.24 The European Community, especially after the 1960s, also vowed to
19 Finnemore 1996, 339.
20 Boli, Meyer, Ramirez and Thomas 1997.
21 Hall 1989.
22 Sikkink 1993b.
23 Sikkink 1993a, 414.




























































































guarantee fundamental rights.25 And states also ratified a number of 
International Labor Office conventions to protect the rights of workers, 
including foreign ones. Europe is subsequently, the “most likely” case for the 
impact of norms to be observed.26
The protection of strangers should constitute an important test for human 
rights since they do not claim protection as members of a family, clan, or nation 
but as members of humanity. Writing about Europe in the 1930s, Hanna Arendt 
pointed out that refugees found out cruelly that “loss of national rights was 
identical to loss of human rights, that the former inevitably entailed the latter” 
(1979, p. 292). Does her statement still hold true? If not, can we attribute this 
change to the successful incorporation of post-war international human rights 
norms into domestic polities? One could consider that international human 
rights norms should take great care in asserting the rights of aliens since they 
cannot avail themselves of the rights reserved for citizens such as rights of 
political participation and, in this respect, are more likely to see their rights 
usurped. Moreover, since immigration is an international phenomenon by 
nature, international rules designed to regulate the status of migrants should 
abound. Notwithstanding, immigration is a very sensitive issue politically, the 
ability to choose who to include within the polity is one of the founding 
prerogatives of nation-states and migration control is a stated policy goal in 
Europe since the 1970s so resistance from national governments is to be 
expected in this area.27 One can therefore legitimately wonder to what extent the 
European human rights regime includes non-nationals within its realm of 
protection and what incidence it has had on foreigners' rights at the national 
level.
25 When the European Court of Justice (ECJ) established supremacy and direct effect of 
Community law, German and Italian constitutional courts declared that they would not 
recognize Community law whenever the latter was incompatible with domestic constitutional 
protection of individual freedoms The ECJ fearing for its autonomy and challenged in its 
authority responded by recognizing as a source constitutional principles common to the 
member states. It is now explicitly stated in Article F of the Treaty on European Union. See 
Currie 1994 and Alter 1996.
26 On this methodology, see Eckstein 1975; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994. For a study on 
the impact of international norms using a "least likely” case study, see Legro 1997.
27 In this respect, it should be clear that, the protection of aliens, as a policy area, is not a most 
likely case for the effect of international norms a priori. Notwithstanding, Europe is the most 




























































































The state of the debate in the immigration and citizenship literature
In Limits of Citizenship, Yasemin Soysal states that the post-war elaboration of 
an international human rights discourse has functioned as a powerful norm 
guiding behavior at the domestic level. In her view, “international governmental 
and non-governmental organizations, legal institutions, networks of experts, and 
scientific communities (...) by advising national governments, enforcing legal 
categories, crafting models and standards, and producing reports and 
recommendations, promote and diffuse ideas and norms about universal human 
rights.”28 She points to the creation of a number of international charters 
providing nation-states with guidelines for the treatment of non-citizen 
populations on their territory. She argues that the transnational development and 
diffusion of a legitimizing discourse based on universal human rights explains 
why foreigners acquired more rights in a number of European countries even 
after they were no longer needed as workers. She correlates the emergence of 
human rights arguments and the new conception of state membership that came 
with it with the evolution of foreigners' rights. The causal mechanisms whereby 
one leads to another remain unclear from the examples that she provides.29 A 
more systematic research design is thus necessary to assess both parts of her 
hypothesis if we are to ascertain that national actors adopt transnational norms 
that affect policy outcomes. For, as Soysal herself underlines, it is still up to 
nation-states to abide by international norms.30 Gérard Noiriel's study on the 
right of asylum underlines that international texts are applied by state 
administrations and courts who do so according to their own national values 
and with their own notion of the national interest in mind.31 Jeff Chekel’s work 
on international norms and citizenship debates in post-cold-war Europe has also 
emphasized that the incorporation of norms vary according to a country's state- 
societal relationship.32
Other recent works have gone even further than Yasemin Soysal in 
pointing to international constraints on the capacity of nation-states to control 
migration. Saskia Sassen in a book revealingly entitled Losing Control?, points 
to the external economic and human rights constraints on restrictive control 
policies that render them mostly symbolic. They constitute a way for national 
governments to appear to control transnational phenomena such as migration 
while they no longer can effectively.33 She further predicts that the coexistence
28 Soysal 1994, 152.
29 Soysal 1994, 143-156.































































































between an open regime for capital and a closed one for labor is too unstable to 
last. Controlling immigration, a volume edited by Wayne Cornelius, Philip 
Martin, and Jim Hollifield, also highlights the gap that exists between the stated 
restrictive goals of migration control policy in advanced liberal democracies 
and the results achieved.34 National agencies have not been able to prevent 
unsolicited flows of family members, and asylum-seekers to come and stay nor 
can they expel undocumented aliens as they please. David Jacobson in Rights 
across borders makes the strongest claim about the causal link between the 
failure of the state to control migration and the rise of an international human 
rights regime. In his view, “the basis of state legitimacy is shifting from 
principles of sovereignty and national self-determination to international human 
rights.”35
These claims have not gone unchallenged. Some scholars have pointed 
out that, although one cannot deny that normative constraints have limited the 
ability of migration control agencies to stem unsolicited migration flows, the 
latter have stemmed from domestic constitutions and activist judiciaries. Jim 
Hollifield has argued that it was the liberal norms of democratic European 
states that explains why, after the mid-1970s, foreign workers stayed and their 
families came to join them. Political science and legal studies on policies 
towards asylum-seekers and family reunification conducted by Christian 
Joppke, Gerald Neuman, and John Guendelsberger further show that aliens 
secured rights in countries such as Germany and France through activist 
national judiciaries basing their jurisprudence on national constitutional norms 
rather than international human rights standards.36 The same phenomenon has 
also been observed in the United States.37
Another line of analysis has focused on the claim that states are indeed 
losing control over migration policy whether because of national or 
international constraints. Gary Freeman38 and Galiya Lahav39 have described 
how, in the recent period, national agencies have devised new means of 
preventing migration, raised budgets for control agencies, multiplied and 
diversified controls and shown that the number of entries does not suggest a 
massive “migration crisis” in advanced liberal democracies. Researchers 
focusing on new intergovernmental cooperation on immigration and asylum 
issues present yet a more sceptical view of the impact of human rights norms.
34 Cornelius. Martin, and Hollifield 1994.
35 Jacobson 1996, 2.
36 Joppke 1997, 1998; Neuman 1990; Guendelsberger 1988.
37 Schuck 1984, 1992.
38 Freeman 1994.




























































































International agreements such as Schengen have increased the coordination of 
police and border officials from different countries while diminishing their 
accountability in ways that render migration control more rather than less 
efficient.40 In many ways, the polemic within the field of international migration 
re-enacts theoretical debates in IR. Some emphasize the causal impact of 
international institutions, others affirm the preeminence of domestic factors, and 
yet another group see international cooperation as strictly maximizing state 
capacities to meet their national policy goals. The research design outlined in 
the next section aims at testing the empirical robustness of these diverging 
views.
Testing the impact of norms in comparative perspective
The dependent variable in this study consists in changes in the rights of 
foreigners (legislative, regulatory, or jurisprudential) since 1973 when European 
governments declared an official stop to foreign labor recruitment and 
developed restrictive control policies. The countries chosen for study are 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands. These three countries all belong to the 
same web of international organizations and have signed the same international 
covenants and treaties. They should therefore be exposed to the same 
international normative pressures. When process-tracing the impact of norms, 1 
will focus on the dispersion in the way they interpret and incorporate similar 
international norms.
These countries have comparable numbers of foreigners on their soil.41 
Other factors are also controlled for, namely economic ones. The available 
economics literature regarding the impact of migration on the income of natives, 
employment, or GDP is still relatively inconclusive or has found little or no 
impact and, in any case, has not shown that there were significant differences 
among countries.42 In any case, the three countries have similar stated 
(restrictive) migration control goals since the oil shock. This means that I am 
controlling for “state interests” as realists would consider these policy goals.
40 Bigo 1992, 1996. Guiraudon and Lahav 1997.
41 See SOPEMI 1992. In 1990, there were 4.6% of foreigners in the Netherlands, 6.4% in 
France, 8.2% in Germany. They are many less in Great Britain (a special case because of its 
lack of constitution) and Scandinavia and many more in countries like Luxemburg and 
Switzerland (the latter is not part of the same international institutions in any case). 1 sought to 
have the smallest variation between the three cases possible with respect to the size of the 
foreign and immigrant population.
42 Economic studies of the impact of migration include Altonji and Card 1989; Ortega 1996; 




























































































The mechanisms whereby norms that transcend the national level can 
result in domestic changes in aliens’ rights fall into different categories. I focus 
here on international norms that can have a national impact through legally 
binding agreements. They are more observable and their effect is more traceable 
than non-legal norms. They are also more likely to have an effect because of 
their very degree of institutionalization. They include human rights norms such 
as those of the European Convention of Human Rights and norms based on 
other principles (e. g. freedom of trade and services) as they might be found in 
the Treaty of Rome. The main empirical focus here is on the European courts 
that have monitoring and enforcement powers (the European Court of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Justice).
Next, I study the intervening variables that account for cross-national 
variance in the incorporation of European legal norms. The phases that separate 
the adoption of an international text and its appearance in national regulations 
and laws are numerous. So are the conditions necessary for international norms 
to result in a domestic praxis. Even once international jurisprudence on an area 
has emerged, national factors need to be taken into account to understand 
whether the latter will be incorporated by national legal systems. These factors 
include 1) national rules of legal incorporation 2) the existence of national legal 
cultures favorable to international law and to human rights argumentations, 3) 
the mobilization of knowledgeable subnational actors, and 4) the congruence of 
international and national norms.
Finally, I consider the role of supranational actors such as the European 
Parliament, and the European Commission, Brussels-based NGOs and 
consultative initiatives such as the Forum of Migrants, along with subnational 
actors who refer to international declarations as a basis for the legitimacy of 
their claims. The question is whether a transnational issue network that could 
help diffuse international norms has emerged. The latter could also include 
neighbouring countries and sending countries that seek to exert pressure to 




























































































I. The marginal effect of international legal human rights norms
What norms have emerged from the international human rights law? What are 
the conditions necessary for the incorporation of norms in national contexts and 
for their impact on policy? Answering these questions requires the analysis of 
international human rights legal norms and the ways in which they speak to 
issues affecting the rights of foreigners -especially insofar as signatories are 
meant to protect the fundamental freedoms of people within their jurisdiction 
regardless of nationality. It also entails a systematic comparative study of the 
incorporation of these norms nationally -by courts but also by political actors 
and policy-makers.
1. The European Court of Human Rights and foreigners: Legal basis and 
jurisprudence
The notion that human rights instruments protect people regardless of the 
passport that they hold is the first one that needs to be tested here. In order to 
ascertain that the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality is 
an important international norm, we need to study the text themselves. In fact, 
postwar conventions setting human rights standards in Western Europe put a 
number of hindrances to their universal application. Political rights are 
explicitly reserved for citizens (Article 16 of the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 25 of the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Compared to the 
citizenship paradigm, the human rights one is more limited as it overlooks civic 
rights and political participation of non-nationals.43 As the minutes of 
international courts never fail to reiterate, the leitmotiv in human rights 
covenants is that the principle of national sovereignty of the contracting parties 
is not to be challenged. The state can decide who enters, who participates in the 
"general will", who can become part of the nation and naturalize. The same 
remark applies to conventions which focus on socioeconomic rights in so far as 
the latter justify laws aiming at the protection of the national labor market 
(except for the European Union treaties). The 1966 International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination also specifically mentions 
that discriminations on the basis of nationality do not apply (Article 1, § 2). 
Furthermore, a number of treaties undermine the universal character of human 
rights by restricting the enjoyment of rights to specific nationalities based on the 
principle of reciprocity. Such is the case of the 1977 European Convention on 
the Legal Status of Migrant Workers or the European Social Charter.
43 For an interesting discussion of the relationship between citizenship and human rights 




























































































Another substantive characteristic of international conventions is that the 
nation-state is designated as responsible for organizing state membership and 
implementing human rights principles. Before they do, a number of procedural 
loopholes allows them to avoid such implementation. First, international 
agreements do not all have a legal value. It sometimes takes decades before they 
are ratified and states can do so only partially and/or fail to ratify controversial 
protocols. Individual petition to an international court is not always possible. 
Moreover, states use "reserves" or "interpretative declarations" when adhering 
to international conventions so that "a large part of the system of protection [of 
rights] is excluded in a way which is antinomical with the idea of a minimum 
standard of protection embedded in those texts.”44 45One such example regards 
the "declarations and reservations" that France published after it adhered to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1980. It 
stated that the articles of the Pact which proclaimed a universal right to work 
and welfare "should not be interpreted as obstacles to enacting regulations 
foreigners' access to the labor market or establishing residence criteria for the 
allocation of certain welfare benefits."43 The Dutch Parliament, when 
considering the European Social Charter in 1978, also entered a reservation so 
that the lack of adequate means of subsistence could remain a ground for 
expulsion in spite of the charter.46
What about the jurisprudence of human rights courts, in particular the 
record of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECHR)? From 1959 when 
the Court started functioning until December 1993, less than a dozen decisions 
have involved the civil rights of foreigners (2.5% of the decisions).47 The 
decisions were all issued during the last ten years. In fact, the number of cases 
in Strasbourg rose geometrically during that period, aliens’ related cases as 
well. It apparently took a long time for the ECHR to be known and utilized by 
lawyers and, in the case of France, for individual petitions to be allowed. Most 
plaintiffs appealed expulsion decisions or administrative refusals of entry and 
residence permits. They generally purported that, in the handling of their cases, 
public authorities had violated rights guaranteed under Article 3 (protection 
against inhuman treatment) and/or Article 8 (right to lead a normal family life)
44 Frowein 1990, 193.
45 See Journal Officiel, 1 February 1981,405.
46 This ground for expulsion allows states to send back foreigners who, for instance, no longer 
receive unemployment benefits. For a debate about the reservation, see Kruyt 1978 and Swart 
1978,9.





























































































of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter referred to as “the Convention”).48
Article 3 is often invoked in cases of asylum-seekers whose demand for 
refugee status has been rejected and who claim that they will suffer inhuman or 
degrading treatment if they are sent back to their country of origin. At first, the 
Court did not find that Article 3 was violated in the individual cases that were 
submitted (Cruz Varas et al. vs Sweden; Vilvarajah et al. vs. United Kingdom; 
Viyayanathan and Pusparajah vs. France). More recently however, the Court 
stated that the absolute character of the provision means that protection cannot 
be ruled out by considerations relating to the public security of the state 
(Chahal vs. United Kingdom, 15 November 1996). In three cases, it found that 
Article 3 would be violated if the applicants were to be deported or extradited.49 
Although the Court recognizes different kinds of “inhuman treatment,” (one 
case involved an applicant in the final stages of AIDS), the applicants must 
show that they face a “real risk” if they are sent back and the Court’s standard 
when it comes to the burden of proof is very high.50
The Court has also ruled that Article 8 had been violated. In cases 
involving foreigners who had lived in the host country since childhood and had 
tenuous ties to their country of origin, the Commission and the Court 
considered that their expulsion from the receiving country could not be 
tolerated even if they had an important criminal record (Moustaquim versus 
Belgium, Beldjoudi versus France, Nasri versus France, C. Versus Belgium).51 
In a case involving a divorced foreign father of a Dutch girl, the Court found 
that he could not be denied entry or residence into the Netherlands so as to see 
his daughter (Berrehab versus Netherlands). Article 8 has been, in fact, one of 
the most dynamically interpreted provision in the Convention, not only in cases 
regarding aliens.52
48 Other foreigner-related cases addressed language or translation fees issues in violation of 
Article 6, § 3a or Article 6, § 3e : Luedicke, Belkacem and Ko? vs. Germany (28 November 
1978 decision); OztUrk vs. Germany (21 February 1984); Brozinek vs. Italy (19 December 
1989 decision). See Berger 1994 for exhaustive jurisprudential details.
49 There are Ahmed versus Austria (17 December 1996), D. versus United Kingdom (2 May 
1997), and the aforementioned Chahal case.
50 In the latest judgement of the Court on Article 3, a case involving a Columbian drug dealer 
who had released information on other traffickers to the French police, the judges did not 
believe that he faced a "real risk” if deported back to Columbia...(case of H. L. R. versus 
France, 29 April 1997).
51 In a very recent case, Boughanemi versus France (24 April 1996), the Court did find that 
the criminal record of the applicant weighed too heavily against him and did not find a 
violation of Article 8 although they acknowledged that he had family ties in France.




























































































In the Convention, other provisions address more directly the foreigners' 
condition or could be invoked to protect other aspects of the rights of 
foreigners. Article 14 of the ECHR which bans discrimination on many grounds 
including race, color, language, religion and national origin is sometimes 
invoked by litigating parties in cases involving aliens yet has been deemed 
irrelevant by the judges.53 There is no case before the Court involving human 
rights dispositions which specifically protect foreigners: against expulsion 
(Article 1, 7th Protocol)54 and against collective expulsion (Article 4, 4th 
Protocol).
The right to manifest one’s religious beliefs (subject to limitations) is 
covered by Article 9 of the Convention. Given the salience of debates on the 
cultural rights or religious freedom of aliens, one might have expected an appeal 
to the ECHR yet no case is before the Court that involves a foreigner claiming a 
violation under Article 9.55 Several plaintiffs invoked violations of Article 9 
before the Commission that decides on the admissibility of cases; only 4 were 
deemed admissible. The Commission has apparently “chosen to restrict itself in 
the manner in which it can interpret Article 9.”56 relying on other Convention 
provisions to claim that the latter was a priori incapable of accomodating certain 
categories of religiously-based claims for exemption from generally applicable, 
neutral laws. Moslem litigants did not see their cases admitted. The 
Commission avoided pronouncing itself on a case involving a Muslim teacher 
who had not been permitted to be absent to pray at a mosque on Friday 
afternoons (Ahmad versus United Kingdom).57 It declared inadmissible the case 
of a Muslim who wanted to marry a girl under 16 in the UK (Khan versus 
United Kingdom)58 and one who wanted his marriage according to a “special 
religious ritual” recognized by state authorities (X versus FRG).59
Buddhist and Sikhs did not fare better. In their cases, the Commission did 
not “avoid the issue”60 entirely but stated that limitations which, article 
paragraph 2 of Article 9 “are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society” applied. According to the Commission, for various health
53 Kruger and Strasser 1994.
54 Germany and the Netherlands have yet to ratify this Protocol.
55 Most cases have involved Greeks in their own country. For an extensive and most recent 
discussion of the interpretation of Article 9, see Stavros 1997. For a more general discusion of 
freedom of religion and international law, see Thomberry 1991.
56 Stavros 1997, 615.
57 case 8160/78 dated 12 March 1981.
58 case 11579/85 dated 7 July 1986.





























































































and security reasons, a Buddhist prisoner could not grow a beard which 
prevented his guards to identify him,61 nor could a high caste Sikh refuse to 
sweep his cell,62 nor could a Sikh motorcyclist refuse to wear a crash helmet to 
keep his turban on.63 The Commission also declared inadmissible the two cases 
involving Moslem headscarves (they concerned Turkish women in their home 
country who had been "punished" for wearing a veil in an university and in the 
army rather than women migrants).64 The Commission's argument was that they 
had chosen freely to attend secular institutions and they could still practice their 
religion outside. It is significant that national jurisdictions have taken a stronger 
stance on the protection of religious expression. This was the case of French 
Council of State's 1989 recommendation following the Creil foulard affair. In 
Germany as well, courts have given religious freedom priority over the state 
mandate to provide education in cases involving Moslem girls.65 In fact, after 
20 years of unsuccessful applications to Strasbourg in cases involving religious 
or cultural minorities, calls for a new Optional protocol specifically 
guaranteeing the rights of minorities have been heeded in order to circumvent 
the prudence of the Commission and the Court.66
Why is ECHR jurisprudence on aliens limited to condemning states for 
violating Article 8 (right to lead a normal family life) and 3 (protection against 
inhuman treatment)? Perhaps, it highlights a certain dynamic: Once the Court 
opened a breach of redress by recognizing the pertinence of Article 3 and 8 in 
cases of expulsion, lawyers and associations engulfed themselves in it so as to 
find similar cases to fatten the jurisprudence in this area or to uncover other 
types of application. Ultimately, the goal is to publicize the Court decisions at 
the national level so that not only national tribunals take into account the 
Convention's articles and the relevant Court decisions but also governments are 
deterred from challenging family reunification principles in new regulations. 
Another factor may be the prudence of the Court when it comes to burning 
political issues such as immigration or multiculturalism. It balks at solving
61 Case 1753/63 versus Austria dated 15 February 1965.
62 X versus United Kingdom. Case 8231/78 dated 6 March 1982.
63 X versus United Kingdom. Case 7992/77 dated 12 July 1978.
64 See decisions 16278/90 in Karaduman versus Turkey and 18783/91 both dated 3 May
1993.
65 Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs 1994, 50. This state of affairs 
stands in contrast with the Federal Constitutional Court decision banning crucifixes in 
Bavarian public schools.
66 See Poulter 1997. The final blow to lawyers may have been Buckley versus United 
Kingdom, a case involving a British gypsy when the Commission set a precedent by admitting 
her case but the Court found no violation. The Commission had admitted her case on the 





























































































nations' problems and taking clear-cut sides in controversial issues. This is a 
matter of maintaining credibility and legitimacy rather having decisions 
dismissed as "judicial meddling" by irate signatory states. The fact that the 
ECHR has not found any state to violate Article 14 for discriminating on the 
basis of national origin is telling in this respect.67 The ECHR has perhaps 
chosen to ascertain its authority slowly.
Notwithstanding the reasons, the ECHR has only been able to pronounce 
itself on narrow aspects of a foreigner's rights. Even in these cases, the Court 
has clearly circumscribed the conditions under which the right protected is 
deemed violated. In all their decisions, judges reaffirm that they do not forbid 
states from regulating the entry and stay of foreigners nor do they have to judge 
national immigration policy. Decisions actually discuss a number of legitimate 
reasons why a state may want to limit entries such as the economic well-being 
of a country or expel individuals because of threats to public order (to justify 
expulsions). These restrictions are vaguely defined as applying if they are 
"necessary in a democratic society" (Article 8, § 2). The judges estimate the 
proportionality between the legitimate goal of a measure or a law, the means 
used to achieve this goal, and the damage done to the individual(s) as measured 
by the violation of Convention rights. For instance, the Court stated in the 
Abdulaziz case that "regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck 
between the general interest of the community and the interests of the 
individual. [...] a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its 
territory. [...] The duty imposed by Article 8 cannot be considered as extending 
to a general obligation on the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice 
by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept 
non-national spouses for settlement in that country."68 The same wording was 
used again in the Ahmut versus Netherlands decision (28 November 1996), a 
case in which the Court deemed it possible for the claimant to live with his 
partner in his country of origin.
Rather than breaking new grounds and going where no national court had 
gone before, the ECHR confirmed and clarified the pertinence of preexisting 
legal principles. As in other areas, it tried to coordinate national jurisprudences
67 One famous immigration-related case did involve a violation of article 14 but it was a case 
of sexual discrimination. The foreign husbands of foreign women legally residing in the 
United Kingdom (or of British women) were not allowed to join their wives in England 
following the 1980 Immigration Act whereas it was much easier for foreign wives to reunite 
with spouses in the United Kingdom. In Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali vs. United 
Kingdom, the Court unanimously acknowledged the violation (28 May 1985).
68 See European Court of Human Rights 1985, 34. It is only if they cannot go anywhere else 




























































































rather than subjugate national courts and to harmonize preexisting practices 
rather than impose new ones. It is not fortuitous that the main jurisprudence on 
aliens centers around Article 8 on family life. All of the countries studied here 
have a clause inscribed in their Constitution on the right to lead a normal family 
life which resembles Article 8 and they also had made provisions for family 
reunification. In the Netherlands, Article 10 of the Constitution protects private 
life, Article 6 of the German basic Law does the same. In France, as early as 
1978 the highest administrative tribunal struck down government suspension of 
family reunification restrictions on the grounds that it was contrary to the 
principe général du droit (general legal principle) that protected an individual's 
right to a normal family life (Arrêt GISTI). In Germany, in 1983, the Federal 
Constitutional Court forced Bavaria and Baden-Wurtenberg to go back on a 
plan to establish a three-year waiting period for spouses before family 
regrouping in Germany was allowed. The Court deemed it contrary to Article 6 
of the Basic Law on family life, a constitutional provision taken into 
consideration in residence permits and expulsion court cases.69 European human 
rights provide us with insights on the transmission of norms: national legal 
norms have been the pillar on which international ones have been elaborated.
The "new" norms that emerged from European jurisprudence only gained 
currency nationally when comparable and compatible norms already existed at 
that level. Some IR scholars have also underlined that "new ideas are more 
likely to be influential if they 'fit' well with existing ideas and ideologies in a 
particular historical setting."70 The persuasiveness of ideas stems in this respect 
from their ability to insert themselves within existing paradigms.71 Not 
expelling a young foreigner back to a country where he has no family ties is 
indeed a norm that is more likely to be understood if the host society and its 
legal institutions believe in the importance of family life. The import of norms 
in this view stems from their capacity to evoke commonly held beliefs and 
interpretations. This is in some ways commonsensical: one accepts what one 
already knows. Ideologies, beliefs, culture are usually vague enough to 
accommodate a wide range of ideas including conflicting ones. Consequently, it 
may be possible most of the time to find a posteriori domestic beliefs that 'fit' 
international norms. The more specific point here is that the international norms 
































































































The ECHR’s jurisprudence has been circumscribed to very specific areas 
of rights with respect to the protection of aliens. This has to do with the logic of 
“increasing returns”72 of litigation whereby one success in court based on a 
particular provision leads lawyers to multiply cases based on those grounds. In 
addition, it can be explained by the preexistence of national jurisprudence in 
these specific areas. The Court has not exploited the Convention fully in this 
respect. The ensuing question is whether that particular jurisprudence has been 
incorporated in national law, or taken into account by policy-makers.
2. The national incorporation ofECHR norms
Drawing on the experience of France, Germany and the Netherlands, I assess 
the role of domestic jurisdictions and actors in the process of incorporation of 
ECHR norms. How can the jurisprudence of the ECHR add to national 
practices? One of the main means of exerting pressures on nation-states consists 
in shaming violators by publishing court decisions and reports. Within the 
European Convention of Human Rights framework, the Committee of Ministers 
can order the Commission to do so. Yet, nearly all cases are reported so that 
"whatever force lay in this threat has now been lost."73 More leverage is gained 
from "institutional cooptation,"74 in particular when national courts refer to 
international human rights standards in their pronouncements. Vincent Berger, 
division head at the Clerk's Office of the Court, speaks of the "preventive 
consequences" of Court cases such as when a government changes domestic 
regulations or makes reform promises during a legal procedure in Strasbourg; 
or, in countries where an individual right of petition has been granted, when 
national tribunals take greater care in respecting the Convention so as not to 
have their decisions overruled in Strasbourg. He acknowledges that these 
effects are very far from systematic.75
The first striking aspect of national implementation is that has been 
delayed or non-existent in the cases studied. In France, international human 
rights norms were drawn upon only starting in 1991. France ratified the 1950 
Convention in 1974 and waited until 1981 to permit individual petition under 
Article 25. In 1988, the French Council of State gave full effect to Article 55 of 
the Constitution under which treaties which are signed, ratified and published 
take precedence over domestic statutes in the Arrêt Nicolo. One had to wait two
72 For an application of the notion of "increasing returns” to non-economic phenomena, see 
Pierson 1997; On the original concept in economics, see Arthur 1994 on path dependence and 
Blanchard and Summers 1987 on hysteresis.
73 Mower 1981.
74 Moravcik 1994.




























































































more years however before the Council of State held that Article 8 of the 
European Convention could be used whenever the legality of decisions taken 
against aliens were challenged on those grounds.76
Contrary to the French, the Dutch promptly ratified the European 
Convention (in 1954) and allowed individual petition. Notwithstanding, 
national judges and authorities ignored the treaty for about a quarter of a 
century.77 This has been explained by ignorance, the lack of prestige of 
Strasbourg and the belief that "the invocation of the Convention was a sign of 
weakness and was only adhered to when no other reasonable argument was 
available.”78 The Dutch Constitution regulates the internal force of treaties in a 
monistic way and, in its 93rd Article, states that "self-executing" treaty 
provisions will be binding from the time of publication. However, until the 
1980s, judges did not deem the ECHR self-executing. They preferred to apply a 
comparable provision of Dutch law and, in cases when they did apply the 
Convention, they did so in a very restrictive way.
Postwar Germany counts among the few countries with extensive 
judicial review and its Basic Law offers strong human rights guarantees. Very 
few complaints have been filed with the European Commission of Human 
Rights.79 Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court can only base its 
decisions on the Constitution. Consequently, on many occasions, the Court has 
held that a constitutional complaint cannot be based on an alleged violation of 
the European Convention. It only accepts to interpret the Convention in cases in 
which a court has violated a plaintiffs fundamental right to equality before the 
law under Article 3 of the Basic law80 by mis-applying or disregarding the 
Convention in an arbitrary fashion.81 Whether this reluctance demonstrates a 
fear of being overruled by the ECHR, a desire to avoid having to bring in the 
complexity of the Convention's concepts and jurisprudence, or a will to keep its
76 The landmark decisions were taken in the Beldjoudi (18 January 1991), Babas and 
Belgacem (both 19 April 1991) cases.
77 Meyjer 1985, 11.
78 Zwaak 1989,40.
79 One of the cases before the ECHR (Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç) regarded the right to a 
free interpreter during a legal procedure for a non-German speaker. After Germany was 
condemned, the German Parliament amended the relevant legislation. It has not done so in 
other cases when Germany was condemned however.
80 Or in cases when a state law is deemed incompatible with the Convention which has the 
statute of a federal law.
81 See Steinberger 1985. In two 1987 decisions, it found no violation of the law yet, later, it 
created a special appeal for violation of the Convention and equality before the law in the 





























































































jurisdiction separate from the European Court to avoid contradictions between 
the two courts, this state of affair limits the impact of the European Human 
Rights Convention in Germany, although administrative courts should apply 
and respect it.
So can one find concrete evidence showing that national courts and 
policy-makers are taking ECHR jurisprudence into account? When asked about 
the incidence of the Convention on immigration policymaking, a German 
Interior Ministry official dismissed it by saying that the Convention had been 
ratified in 1952 and that its mark remained to be seen in the elaboration Aliens 
Acts including the 1991 one.82 The statement is almost true: there is one 
mention of the Convention in the Aliens Act. What he meant is that the 
Convention does not lead to self-censorship on their part. The government here 
is in harmony with court records. They have generally preferred to refer to 
ECHR decisions when the latter display judicial restraint. For instance, in 1982, 
when the Highest Administrative Tribunal examined the case of an adult alien 
who wanted to join his parents in the FRG, it referred to a 1977 decision of the 
European Commission of Human Rights to state that no right to a residence 
permit could be derived from article 8.83
In France, the ECHR has served to expand the scope of judicial review in 
France and, since 1991, several government measures and actions regarding 
foreigners have been struck down using Article 3 or 8 of the ECHR. During the 
1993 reforms on the entry and stay of foreigners, Articles 23, 25 (last 
paragraph) and 26 relating to expulsion had to be modified to take new 
Strasbourg-based standards into account. Government internal documents now 
include a sort of warning against possible litigation on the basis of Article 8.84 
The visas on expulsion decrees also systematically mention the Convention 
article.85 The Interior Ministry is not particularly troubled by the incidence of 
international law and considers it simply a matter of arguing well either the non­
existence of strong ties in France or the overriding danger to public safety. 
Based on the report of an academic familiar with the jurisprudence of Article 8, 
a special residence permit labelled “private and family life” may be delivered to 
foreigners under threat of expulsion yet with no ties outside France.86 Article 3
82 Interview with Mr. Malwald, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Bonn, 1995.
83 Steinberger 1985.
84 See "les évolutions du droit des étrangers" internal Interior Ministry document (procured 
during an interview with Oriane Foumier-Belmont, French Ministry of Interior, Paris, 1994).
85 The automaticity of the mention is a way of warding off court cases or showing good will 
in appeals.





























































































of the ECHR which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals is 
also beginning to be taken into account at least on paper. Administrative 
tribunals and the Council of State thus annulled a number of arrêts de 
reconduite à la frontière (orders to leave the territory). The Interior Ministry in 
a 1991 circular listed the countries where foreigners could not be sent back. It 
also now motivates its decisions in the written orders.
There is a similarity in the use of Article 3 and 8 of the ECHR. They have 
affected the outcome of individual cases and, in cases where the government 
was faced with a large amount of litigation cases, administrative procedure. To 
understand these developments, one cannot underestimate the role of French 
lawyers and associations such as the GISTI (Groupe d ’information et de 
Soutien aux Travailleurs Immigrés) who built more and stronger cases referring 
to the ECHR as well as that of a minority of magistrates who believed that 
France should respect its international engagements.87 Rather than an "epistemic 
community," one can speak of a motley crew made up of actors with different 
motivations. Magistrates within the Council of State exerting internal pressure 
for the incorporation of the ECHR were concerned less with human rights 
norms or aliens rights as such than with competition with other jurisdictions 
who were already applying the Convention88 and the risk of being short- 
circuited by international courts.
In the Netherlands, the attitude of the courts towards human rights treaties 
evolved in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the Supreme Court took a few 
landmark decisions invoking the ECHR. It is within this context that one should 
situate the 1986 ruling of the Supreme Court which stated that the President of a 
District Court had been right to annul a deportation order based on the right to 
lead a normal family life although the Ministry of Justice had argued that this 
right only applied to allowing family members to join a foreigner already 
established in the Netherlands.89 The political climate probably played a role. 
The decision of the Court followed the enactment of a liberal minority policy 
and thus was synchronized with a general improvement in the rights of 
foreigners (they first voted in local elections in 1986). Now, the Judicial Section 
of the Council of State, the highest administrative tribunal responsible for 
reviewing administrative decisions including those taken by the Ministry of
87 Interview with Roger Errera and Olivier Stim, French Council of State, 1995 and 1996 
respectively. Interview with Danièle Lochak, president of the Groupe d’information et de 
Soutien aux Travailleurs Immigrés and law professor, Paris, 1995.
88 The Cour de Cassation had recognized the superiority of international agreements as early 
as 1975 (arrêt Vabre) so the administrative courts were trailing behind.





























































































Justice in the area of immigration and asylum, has crafted precise criteria for the 
taking into consideration of Article 8 such as the age of children, regularity of 
contacts, means of financial support.90 Furthermore, the Judicial Section of the 
Council of State has also decided that divorced women in the country of origin 
could join their former family in the Netherlands if they are socially isolated.91 
The limits of the Convention's impact, however, are those imposed by 
Strasbourg case-law which the Council of State often quotes: "regard must be 
had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the 
community and the interests of the individual."92
The activism of public interest law organizations has been instrumental in 
insuring that foreigners benefited from the provisions of international law (in 
particular, the Working Group for Legal Aid on Immigrants). They have done 
so by filing suits to create case law and through lobbying as well (e.g. by 
providing legal arguments to MPs who needed concrete arguments while 
building coalitions to reform foreigners law).93 The Dutch case bears 
resemblances with the French one insofar as the evolution of the judiciary 
towards international law and the imagination of local activists looking for new 
bases for reform coincided to result in a limited number of cases in changes in 
administrative criteria or practice. This grouping of factors seems to have been 
missing in Germany. There, the legal profession frowns at excessive 
interference from supranational jurisdictions and texts.94 Not just the courts but 
also many makers of legal doctrine have argued against the implementation of 
international law. For instance, prominent scholars have held that the European 
Social Charter (Article 19 and 20 on migrants' rights) could not be directly 
applied in Germany.95
It should also be underlined that governments pay attention when they are 
condemned by the ECHR but do not reconsider their policies when other 
countries are condemned on other aspects of the issue. Both France and the 
Netherlands were involved in cases related to the application of Article 8. The 
situation of the plaintiffs were different. Each country focused on clarifying 
administrative practice to avoid further similar situations rather than on the 
significance of article 8 as a whole. Germany was not condemned on family life 
issues. The cases involving foreigners regarded court interpreters’ fees. 
Germany considered changing the law on that issue but disregarded the
90 Badoux 1992.
91 Badoux 1992. For the ECHR interpretation of these notions, see Madudeira 1989.
92 European Court of Human Rights 1985, 34.
93 Groenendijk 1980.





























































































Strasbourg case-law on family life. The evidence contradicts the argument that a 
transnational human rights norms uniformly pervade national scenes. 
Similarities in the rights of foreigners across countries are due to parallel 
developments rather than a convergence imposed from above.
Moreover, there remains cross-national differences in the number of 
recourses to the ECHR and in its impact and they originate in the judicial 
politics of the signatory states In our three cases, until December 1993, 27 
affairs concerned Germany in the Court and Germany was condemned in 10 (in 
37% of the cases). France was involved in 44 Court decisions and the ECHR 
found that there was a violation in 23 of them (58% of the cases). The 
Netherlands was also condemned in 58% of the cases yet only 29 decisions 
involved the Dutch state.96
There are also differences in the impact of the ECHR jurisprudence. They 
are perhaps brought about more by differences or lags in legal culture and the 
strategies of pro-migrant national activists than by legal rules per se although 
German judicial review provisions seem an hindrance to ECHR influences. To 
summarize my findings, some effects of the ECHR jurisprudence are observable 
in the Netherlands starting in the early-to-mid 1980s, early 1990s in France. In 
both countries, there was an active public interest law organization that 
multiplied cases before the courts. They succeeded only once the attitude of the 
latter towards international law changed which took longer in France who was 
the last to ratify the whole Convention and allow individual petition. In 
Germany, lawyers and judges seem to focus on the German Basic law more than 
on the Convention. Consequently, one sees both less recourse to and less impact 
of the ECHR.
Long before ECHR and ECJ decisions on the matter, improvements in 
foreigners' rights had been achieved through other means and activists had 
availed themselves of other -nation-based- means. This means ECHR 
jurisprudence fails a simple causal test of antecedence. Opportunities for the 
improvement of the status of foreigners have emerged because of national 
traditions embodied in law prior to the emergence of a postwar human rights 
discourse. This is the case of family reunification guarantees in Germany which 
were secured because a right to family life is inscribed in the Fundamental Law 
of 1949. Its Sixth Article reflects a concern for traditional family values as 
constitutive of the national character which antedated the war. In France, 
administrative judges were defending the rights of foreigners on human rights 
grounds before 1991 and, in particular, their right to lead a normal family life.




























































































The aforementioned 1978 Arrêt GISTI by the Council of State was an important 
episode in an arm wrestle opposing the executive and the administrative court 
on immigration measures97. It was a clear judicial affirmation of the right of 
family reunion. Furthermore, French domestic law had already incorporated this 
right, in particular in the main postwar text regulating immigration: Article 25 
of the ordonnance of 2 November 1945 lists a number of categories of aliens 
who may not be ordered to leave the country because of their family and social 
situation.
The role of high courts as agents of normative change has been key in the 
area of aliens’ rights. This has been especially the case in Germany where there 
was no legislative change between 1965 and 1991 and the 1965 Aliens Act gave 
the administration great discretion and firmly distinguished fundamental 
liberties for Germans only and those for all.98 In Germany, extensive judicial 
review has favored the development of domestic legal norms and it is the latter 
that are referred to in aliens' law cases. Courts have applied the rule of 
proportionality (Article 20, § 3 of the Basic Law), that implies that the interest 
of the state had to be balanced against the constitutional interests of the foreign 
worker. Therefore, for instance, foreigners can no longer be deported for 
committing a small traffic offence.99 The concept of entrenchment 
(Verwurzelung) which means that the longer a foreigner stays the more 
restricted administrative discretion should be has also been important. Courts 
affirmed that residence and permit renewal guarantees had to be granted to 
foreigners who have a right to develop freely one's personality as it is stated in 
Article 2 of the German constitution and thus must be given the opportunity to 
plan their future.100 Therefore, domestic norms have played a more major role in 
determining the current legal status of foreigners than international legal norms 
as soon as domestic courts entered the fray of immigrant politics.
Finally, the evidence that policymakers themselves refer to European 
human rights to frame their policies towards foreigners is very scant. In other 
words, international legal actors may influence national legal ones but not 
directly national administrative or political ones. In legislative minutes, official 
reports, press coverage and during interviews with civil servants and politicians 
in charge of aliens’ issues, references to international human rights standards
97 See Wihtol de Wenden 1988.
98 Dohse 1981.
99 The first important Federal Constitutional Court decisions date from 26 September 1978 
and 7 January 1979 (Entsheidungendes Bundesverfassungsgericht 1978, 168 and 185; 
Entsheidungendes Bundesverfassungsgericht 1979, 166 and 175).
100 See Schwerdtfeger 1980. As previously mentioned, Article 6 of the Basic Law on 




























































































are rare. Evoking national "traditions of tolerance" is more common. In official 
policy documents, the main justification for bettering the status of aliens is "the 
easing of social tensions" rather than a commitment to liberal values or human 
rights. In 1976, the French Secretary of State in charge of foreign workers, Paul 
Dijoud, announced a range of new social programs and benefits for migrants 
and their family that he deemed "indispensable if we are to avoid, in the near 
future, social tensions that will be almost impossible to surmount."101 This 
argument can be found almost word for word in Dutch and German policy 
documents.102 They recuperate in this way the arguments of the migration 
control camp who also predicts social chaos if migration flows do not abate. 
Moreover, policy-makers consider some provisions for foreigners as benefits 
rather than rights as is the case for certain social rights (services for asylum- 
seekers, non-contributive welfare programs) and for access to employment. The 
rationale for change in these cases is therefore economic, or driven by interest 
groups.
My study of the ECHR and its incorporation has shown the limits of 
European human rights legal norms in protecting aliens. To better understand 
what may explain the uneven and limited impact of this jurisprudence, it may be 
fruitful to compare the ECHR with another European court, the European Court 
of Justice. The comparison of the two jurisprudences towards aliens highlights 
the features of the international organization that impede the development and 
diffusion of norms.
101 Le Monde, 5 November 1976.
102 For German examples of official reports expressing fear of social tensions, see Federal 
Ministry of Interior 1993; Federal Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs 1994; Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Government 1993. For Dutch examples, see WRR 1979 and 
Ministry of Interior of the Netherlands 1983. For additional French examples, see Secrétariat 




























































































II. Comparing the ECHR with other sources of normative change: The 
European Court of Justice and third country nationals
Another set of European organizations likely to affect domestic policy changes 
is the European Union. In particular, scholars of the European Union have 
identified the European Court of Justice as a crucial organization for the 
advancement of European integration and an example of an international agent 
acting against the interests of the principal (the member states) that led to its 
creation.103 This section examines the ECJ's jurisprudence concerning 
foreigners who are not citizens of a member state. In this way, I can compare 
the ECHR's record and influence.
In small and tortuous ways, the legal status of third-country nationals has 
been affected by the jurisprudence of the ECJ in the area of freedom of 
movement. Chronologically, the first example regards the family of a 
Community national who exercises his/her freedom of movement in another 
member-state. They are entitled to the same residence, work and welfare rights 
as a member-state national even if they are not EU nationals; the only difference 
is that they may be required to obtain an entry visa.104 The ECJ has taken a 
robust approach to this obligation of non-discrimination yet it has repeatedly 
made clear that foreign spouses do not have rights of their own and only derive 
them from the Community worker moving to another member-state.105
The second instance of Community law affecting national policy towards 
foreigners is still a burning political issue in some member-states. It regards the 
status of non-EU workers who are employed by Community firms performing 
services in another member-state. In the Rush Portuguesa decision of 27 March 
1990, the ECJ reiterated that the provisions for the suppression of restrictions to 
the freedom of establishment and the freedom to deliver services106 entailed that 
a company could move with its own staff. If some of the company employees 
are third-country nationals, member-states cannot refuse them entry to protect
103 On the influence of the European Court of Justice, see Burley and Mattli 1993; Garrett's 
rebuttal (1995) and Mattli and Slaughter's rejoinder (1995) and update on ECJ studies (1998). 
Garrett 1992; Garrett and Weingast 1993. See also Pierson 1996.
104 See Articles 10 and 11 of Regulation 1612/68 and Articles 1, 2, and 3 of Directives 
73/148, 90/364, 90/365, 90/366.
105 Also, the Court has iterated that EC law would not apply to a non-EC national whose 
European spouse has not moved to another member-state. For details on the jurisprudence on 
these derivative rights, see Lanfranchi 1994, 156-170.
106 They are contained in Article 52 to 59 of the Treaty of Rome and, since 1974, have direct 





























































































their own labor market on the grounds that immigration from non-EU states is a 
matter of national sovereignty. It is deemed a discrimination against the 
company (not the employees) yet, by the same token, non-EU nationals benefit 
from a derived freedom of employment in these cases for as long as they work 
for the company. In effect, although the principle of "Community preference" 
should give priority to EU nationals looking for employment, non-EU nationals 
can invoke the same principle if they work for a EU firm.107 Walking along 
Berlin construction sites and hearing the workers speak Portuguese, English and 
Arabic, one realizes that most of the construction teams contracted include EU 
and non-EU workers but very few Germans. The debate is on-going between 
unions, employers and the government since what may be seen as a right for 
foreign workers has been construed by unions as a form of "social dumping."
Other recent developments in ECJ jurisprudence deserve mention. They 
regard the application of the 1964 EC/Turkey Association Treaty and also of the 
cooperation agreements signed by the EC and North African countries which 
the EEC had entered into under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome.108 Because 
of the high numbers of Turkish and North African workers in France, Germany 
and the Netherlands, any provision on freedom of movement for the nationals of 
the signatory countries had the potential to consolidate significantly the status 
of a large number of foreign residents.
After a long dormant period, important steps towards their 
implementation were taken in the 1980s mainly as a result of ECJ activism. The 
purpose of the EC/Turkey agreement was to achieve Turkey's entry in the EU. 
As it met with political resistance by EC member-states,109 this goal was not 
achieved nor was freedom of movement implemented as required by Article 36 
(P) of the Agreement. The Council of the Association reached a consensus in 
1976 and 1980 on the right of Turkish workers to access the labor market freely 
after a certain period of residence and employment in a member-state yet 
explicitly provided for further implementation of current domestic 
regulations.110 As Kay Hailbronner and Joanne Katsantonis suggest, "member-
107 In fact, there is a project for a Directive to solve this sensitive issue (COM (91) 230 final). 
See Lanfranchi 1994 for an analysis.
108 The Maghreb countries with large contingents of its nationals settled in Europe who have 
concluded cooperation agreements with the EEC are: Algeria (See EEC Council Resolution n° 
2210/78); Morocco (See EEC Council Resolution n° 2211/78) and Tunisia (See EEC Council 
Resolution n° 2212/78). All the resolutions date from 27 September 1978.
109 This was actually due in part to the fear of increased migration flows from Turkey into 
Germany and other receiving countries.
110 EEC-Turkey Association Council Decision 1/80 and 2/76. Article 6 of Decision 1/80 




























































































states clearly intend association law to be incomplete in the sense that no 
individual rights could be inferred from the Council's decisions."111 Yet, a few 
ECJ decisions in the late 1980s were diametrically opposed to what states had 
intended. The ECJ ruled that nationals of the association contracting states had 
directly enforceable rights in a way which made them part of the acquis 
communautaire and had to be upheld by national courts. In the 1987 Demirel 
case involving the right of a Turkish worker's wife to join in Germany, the ECJ 
held that Article 238 of the Treaty gave the Community competence to regulate 
the entry and stay of the nationals of EC-associated states whenever the 
agreement contained "a clear and precise obligation." This decision established 
EC competence in this area. In 1990, the ECJ went much further when it ruled 
in the Sevince case that a right of residence could be implied from the Council 
decisions by arguing that, although these decisions were concerned with the 
right to employment, the latter would be useless without the existence of a right 
of residence. A year later, in the Kziber case, the ECJ interpreted an equal 
treatment clause in the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco with the same 
line of reasoning by vindicating a Moroccan living in Belgium's application for 
special unemployment benefits. This benefit is designated as one of the social 
benefits covered by Article 2 of regulation 1612/68 applicable to EC migrant 
workers. In effect, the Court neglected the difference between an EC national 
and a non-EC national covered by a Cooperation Agreement; the judges applied 
the principles of Community law rather than the limited framework of 
association law.112
Member-states were furious, especially in Germany after the Kus case.113 
The Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry on Social Affairs criticized 
the ECJ decisions. Both the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (the highest
renew their work permit with the same employer, (b) are allowed to respond to another offer 
of employment for the same occupation after three and (c) have a right to access the entire job 
market after four. It also gives family members the right to work after 3 years of legal 
residence and complete freedom of employment after 5 years. Finally, children of Turkish 
workers may work provided that they have completed a course of vocational training in the 
host country. Another Council decision regards access to the welfare state. Decision 3/80 
gives Turkish citizens residing in a EU country "the same rights and obligations with respect 
to social security benefits as citizens of the state." See Faist 1994, 15.
111 Hailbronner and Katsantonis 1992, 57.
112 The framework is laid down in the Vienna Convention on the law on treaties. The Court 
overlooked such principles as reciprocity (there are no unemployment benefits in Morocco).
113 In the latter, a German court asked whether the requirement to renew a work permit 
presupposed a residence permit requirement and whether this only applied to Turks who came 
as workers. The ECJ had answered the first query affirmatively and had stated that a right of 





























































































administrative court) and the Bundessozialsgericht (the highest social court) 
stated that decision 1/80 did not constitute law that Turkish citizens could 
invoke.114 The legal reasoning of the ECJ has been deemed dubious by most 
even by those who welcomed the rulings such as the Commission. This is not 
why member-states reacted so virulently. European countries jealously guard 
their autonomy when it come to the handling of immigration issues and, in this 
field, EU competence is not to be easily recognized.
The "judicial capital [...] which is involved each time that a court breaks 
with the past and makes a new development"115 may have seemed prohibitive 
for the ECJ. In a spring 1995 ECJ decision, judges retreated to some extent from 
their previous stance and did not side with the plaintiff, a Turk with a 
permanent work incapacity whose residence permit was not being renewed. In 
any case, member-states have taken steps to preempt future developments in 
association treaties influence. As these treaties are being renegotiated, new ones 
have been signed (with Poland, Hungary and the former CSFR) and others are 
under discussion, national member-states clearly wish to exclude freedom of 
movement clauses.116 Their attitude is but a sign that, however indirect and 
unexpected, the impact of the agreements signed with countries of emigration 
instilled fear among national governments. The fact that the Treaty on European 
Union does not provide for ECJ automatic judicial review of the decisions taken 
by the Justice and Home Affairs so-called “third pillar” is another illustration 
that member-states are making sure the ECJ will not be an hindrance in their 
plans to restrict aliens' rights. 117 This attitude perhaps stems from the fear that 
international law may further entrench existing rights and make restrictions or 
exceptions arduous in the future.
In reviewing the ECJ record in light of our original question on the 
import of a transnational human rights discourse, it is significant that the 
jurisprudence on third-country aliens was not based on human rights 
considerations. The Court invoked freedom of services or association treaty 
provisions rather than human rights principles. Although the Court constantly 
reiterates that it is its duty to insure observance of fundamental rights in the 
field of Community Law, it does so in a prudent and self-limiting way. In the 
case of third-country nationals, it has avoided this tack altogether. We find in 
the judgments as in the Treaty the "dehumanizing" element which consists in 
"treating workers as factors of production' on a par with goods, services and
114 Faist 1994.
115 Weiler 1993, 253.
116 Interview with Denis Martin, Directorate General V, European Commision, Brussels,
1995.




























































































capital.”118 This is normal given that the ECJ's legal bases are free movement 
clauses not human rights treaties. Nevertheless, it suggests that, whatever effect 
of international norms we observe domestically, it is more likely to depend on 
the characteristics of the international organization that seeks their 
incorporation than on the characteristics of the norms themselves. With a 
narrower basis to protect third country nationals than the ECHR, the ECJ has 
developed a jurisprudence on third country nationals that has led member states 
enough for them to rewrite treaties and find ways to avoid the ECJ’s power of 
review.
III. A transnational network: The missing element?
In this last section, I would like to discuss a factor that may contribute to the 
shortcomings of European norms protecting aliens and the fact they are 
unevenly adopted across nations. This factor can be defined as the lack of a 
coherent transnational issue network. Were such a network exist (and 1 realize 
the limits of the counterfactual argument), one could expect a more significant 
impact of international norms. By transnational network, I mean one that 
involves “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor 
is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an 
intergovernmental organization.”119 In fact, theories of transnational relations 
do not preclude the relevance of issue-oriented networks and cognitive and 
normative exchanges that affect the world view and margin of maneuver of 
national actors.120 In particular, norms diffused by networks made up of 
subnational and supranational actors have been said to influence national 
policies relating to human rights in South and Central America,121 the end of 
apartheid in South Africa,122 and democratization in Eastern and Central 
Europe.123 This is what Kathryn Sikkink calls principled issue-networks. In 
western Europe, Sidney Tarrow recently underlined the growing 
Europeanization of social movements and the transnational character of 
movements that led to normative change in areas such as environmental
118 Weiler 1993,250.
,l9 Risse-Kappen 1995, 3.
120 See the introduction of Risse-Kappen 1995 for a review of the transnational relations 
literature. Thomas Risse-Kappen has stressed the role of the state and societal context in 
understanding variations in the impact of transnational phenomena. In the case at hand, it 
could compensate for differences in the legal systems of the three cases.
121 Sikkink 1993a.
122 Klotz 1995.




























































































policy.124 The question remains whether, in the area of aliens’ rights, there is a 
network made up of supranational, subnational actors, and also foreign powers 
that has organized to militate in favor of the rights of aliens and help diffuse 
human rights norms.
In Europe, there are supranational actors that could join forces with 
NGOs and migrant groups to push for aliens’ rights. The Commission and the 
Parliament have tried, whenever possible, to consolidate the legal status of 
third-country nationals. They even supported reforms such as rights of political 
participation for migrants that were very controversial in countries such as 
Germany or France. The 1975 Vetter report of the European Parliament called 
for an opening of local elections to settled foreign residents.125 The Commission 
has pronounced itself frequently in favor of foreigners' consultation boards and 
associations.126 Yet, member-states have refused to delegate competence in the 
area of migration control and immigrant policy to the EU and have been able to 
keep this policy realm a matter for concerted action.127 In 1985, the Commission 
issued new guidelines on migration128 and argued that integration policy 
entailed a better access to rights for foreign residents. In July, it adopted a 
Decision which set up a procedure for prior communication and consultation of 
new policy towards third-country nationals. Five member-states (including the 
three countries studied here) contested the move successfully: the ECJ annulled 
the Decision in 1987.129 Instead of member states involving the Commission, a 
plethora of inter governmental institutionalized round-tables and agreements 
outside Community framework flourished (the "Ad Hoc Immigration Group", 
TREVI, the coordinating "Rhodes group" and the Schengen agreement). 
Although Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty formally places discussion of 
conditions of entry and residence of non-EU nationals under the EU umbrella, 
only a unanimous Council recommendation followed by ratification in the 
member-states can give the ECJ jurisdiction to interpret recommendations and 
solve disputes and only the Council can transfer competence to the
124 Tarrow 1995. He does point out in Tarrow 1996 that transnationalism is not a new 
phenomenon however.
125 Wihtol de Wenden 1993,33.
126 Commission of the European Communities 1994.
127 Callovi 1994.
128 Commission of the European Communities 1985.
129 See 9 July 1987 decision in joint cases 281, 283-5, 287/85, Rec. 1987, 3023. The Single 
European Act which dates from the period made no provisions for common policies in the 
area of immigration and explicitly excluded measures regarding the free movement of third 
country nationals from qualified majority voting (Article 18, § 2). An appendix states that 
"nothing in these provisions shall effect the right of Member States to take measures as they 
conceive necessary for the purpose of controlling immigration from third countries" (Official 




























































































supranational system of decision-making.130 In brief, the system resembles that 
of inter-governmental groups. This has prompted Andrew Clapham to state that, 
"paradoxically, the Community has rights without responsibilities, rights to 
demand that member-states create a frontier-free Europe but no responsibility to 
ensure that this is done in accordance with the protection of human rights; this 
task is left to national and international machinery."131
There has been little pro-migrant mobilization attempts at the EU level. 
Studies on the emergence of trans-national ethnic organizations and EU-level 
lobbying activities on the part of migrants all suggest that Europe is not yet seen 
as the relevant interlocutor in this policy area.132 Whereas one could see Europe 
as a new political space for migrants to express their claims, little use has been 
made of this supranational “political opportunity structure.”133 During the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), two small NGOs based in Brussels (the 
Migration Policy Group and Starting Line) have sought to put issues such as 
racial discrimination and a common status for third country nationals on the 
agenda. Notwithstanding, they cannot be likened neither in size, means, nor 
influence to other EU lobbies. There is also a Commission-sponsored Forum of 
Migrants made up of various types of immigrants, some foreign others not, from 
around Europe. They have had a strenuous time avoiding in-fighting among 
certain ethnic groups and unearthing a common agenda given the diversity of 
their national situations.
As long as the nation-state is the primary unit for dispensing rights and 
privileges, the nation-state remains the main interlocutor, reference and target of 
interest groups and political actors including migrant and their supporters. 
Thus, even in the case of pro-immigrant groups, human rights are but one 
possible rhetorical weapon in a struggle to defend their interests. NGOs see in 
human rights a minimalist ideology, a toned-down alternative to their 
preexisting Marxist or confessional discourse likely to draw more members. Yet 
migrant organizations offer a different picture. They prefer to base their claims 
on arguments other than human rights such as their contribution to the host 
society and versions of the American "no taxation without representation" 
slogan.134 They draw on existing national public philosophies to legitimize their 
demands135 or to constrain the normative range of solutions available to
130 This procedure is spelt out in article K9 of the Treaty on European Union. Ratification by 
member-states must follow.
131 Clapham 1991, 17.
132 Geddes 1995; Ireland 1995; Amiraux 1997; Favell 1997b; Kastoryano 1994, 1996, 1997.
133 On supranational political opportunity structures, see Tarrow 1995.
133 Interview with Turgut £akmakoglu, President, TUrkische Gemeinde, Berlin, 1995.




























































































policymakers. In Riva Kastoryano’s words, migrant groups "adapt to the rules 
of the game established by the nation-states, use the same tools as public 
authorities as they negotiate for their collective interests."136 Therefore, national 
traditions rather than international norms are predominantly referred to when 
they frame their demands.
In brief, there are elements missing for the success of a “principled-issue 
network” focused on migrant rights in Europe. There is yet to be an adequation 
between the use of a human rights discourse and European-level mobilization. 
Moreover, there are not enough links between pro-migrant EU institutions and 
migrant-led nation-based movements. Part of this might be a question of 
resources on the part of migrants and their perception of the nation-state as 
chiefly responsible for their status and of their EU allies as institutionally weak.
1 now turn to other possible foreign influences that are sometimes 
mentioned in the immigration literature that could contribute to the constitution 
of a principled issue network around migrant rights. The first one concerns 
neighbouring or allied countries who could serve as models for policy change. 
Their influence could lead to a "snowballing" effect137 so that, rather than 
applying a European-level solution, countries would influence one another as in 
domino theory. For instance, Catherine de Wenden has pointing out that it was 
the Consultative Commissions for Immigrants (CCIs) set up in Belgium - 
especially after 1972- that served as models for other countries in the 1970s.138 
There seems to be international "fads" i. e. the spreading of certain policy 
gimmicks and imitation of programs which have been successful in one country. 
The case has also been made that the 1983 reform to grant local voting rights to 
resident aliens in the Netherlands imitated similar experiments in Scandinavia 
(Sweden granted aliens local voting rights in 1975). This may be true in part 
although the first parliamentary debates on voting rights for non-nationals took 
place in 1972 at a time when the voting rights of Dutch nationals living abroad 
were being challenged. Even if it were true, this does not answer the following 
query: why and how did the Netherlands grant voting rights when other 
countries such as France and Germany did not?
The question of imitation effects is often raised in political debates when 
the country in question is an outlier, a really late comer so that geographical 
isolation is in fact a sign of historical backwardness. This was the case in 1981 
when the 1939 decret-loi regulating aliens' freedom of association was finally
136 Kastoryano 1994, 172. See also Kasloryano 1996.
137 Huntington 1991.




























































































overturned so as to lift restrictions on its exercize. During the parliamentary 
debate, the Socialist Véronique Neiertz underlined that "the French legislation 
is in fact clearly behind that of most European countries and, in particular, EEC 
countries, countries like Holland, Sweden (sic) and Denmark who grant 
freedom of association without restrictions."139 The same argument was 
reproduced in Germany during the debate on citizenship: reforms in Belgium 
and the Netherlands were quoted in the draft bills of the social democrats, and 
reformist MPs stated that Germany was out of step with other EC countries and 
would be isolated in the New Europe.140
Yet, copy-cat laws can be restrictive as well as liberalizing. The 
Netherlands recently developed an equal opportunity policy for aliens which 
was officially based on the Canadian model after the recommendations of the 
Dutch Scientific Council. At about the same time, over at the Ministry of 
Justice, plans were made to "plagiarize" Germany's reform of asylum law and 
the concept of "safe country of transit" and "safe country of origin" so as to 
make expulsions of asylum-seekers and illegals easier and the bill passed.141
Sending countries could also participate in a transnational issue network 
to protect migrant rights, so as to defend the interests of their nationals abroad. 
If this were the case, it could offer interesting instances where norms compete 
or contradict each other as the appropriate standards of behavior or principled 
beliefs need not be the same in the host and home country. The question is 
whether this pressure has a normative content and, if it does, whether these 
norms are principled beliefs that seek to foster the status of foreigners. In fact, 
countries of emigration do not necessarily lobby strongly to protect the status of 
their nationals. First, we find instances of sending countries which speak against 
measures aimed at consolidating the status of non-nationals because they 
consider them assimilationist and they threaten to undermine the foreigners' 
loyalty (and end money transfers) to their country of origin. A well-known 
example regards the King of Morocco's mot d'ordre forbidding his nationals to 
vote in Dutch local elections in 1986.142 Morocco also denounced the political 
activity and unionization of its migrants. With the help of French authorities, it 
imprisoned Moroccans who had been active in the French Communist trade
' 39 Assemblée Nationale. 1981. Deuxième Scéance du 29 Septembre 1981. Seconde Session. 
Septième Législature. 1358.
140 Murray 1994,71-2.
141 Interview with, Gerard de Boor, Dutch Ministry of Justice, The Hague, 1995. The 
argument was that Germany's reform had a domino effect: the Netherlands would only accept 
to take foreigners expelled from Germany and who has transited through its territory if they 





























































































union when they vacationed back home.143 Similarly, Algeria spoke against 
freedom of association for foreigners during the 1981 reform, in large part 
because it did not want the monopoly and influence of its antenna in France 
(L'Amicale des Algériens en Europe) to be undermined by new associations.144 
Another attitude on the part of emigration countries besides negative meddling 
was indifference. For instance, Turkey did not want to get involved in matters 
affecting its nationals abroad until very recently after the 1993 deadly attack on 
Turks in Solingen.145
A number of countries of emigration are ex-colonies and have very close 
ties with European countries. While this could give these countries a strong 
bargaining position vis à vis ex-colonial powers who wish to preserve their 
colonial realm of influence. Recent developments show that they do not use it to 
better the status of their nationals. Two recent cases demonstrate the ways in 
which ex-colonies play the "immigration card" in international negotiations 
without having the welfare of their nationals in mind. The first example regards 
Algeria and France. In the summer of 1994, the two countries signed a 
confidential agreement stipulating that Algeria would take back expelled illegal 
aliens whom the French believe to be Algerians even if the aliens have 
destroyed their papers.146 The Algerian military government's reliance on 
France as an ally during the current civil war seems to have been more 
important than the treatment of its nationals. The second case involves Morocco 
and the EU. As the North African country sought to negotiate a favorable 
fishing agreement in 1995, it used the threat of further Moroccan immigration 
as a bargaining chip: "give us a deal, they threaten, or we will give you our 
people."147 Whether for fish quotas or for political support, emigration countries 
are ready to cooperate with Europe on lowering the number of immigrants 
rather than lobby for the rights of the latter.
In summary, at the transnational level, one does not find a committed or 
effectual network of actors that promote international human rights and, in 
particular, the protection of aliens. This implies that international institutions 
such as the ECHR and the ECJ are fairly isolated at the supranational level in a 
way detrimental to their domestic influence.
143 Benoît 1980, 284-6.
144 Weil 1991, 144.
145 For the Turkish government's declaration, see International Herald Tribune, 18 June 
1993. I. For ties between Turks abroad and the government, interview with Turgut 
Çakmakoglu, President, Tiirkische Gemeinde, Berlin, 1995.
146 See Philippe Bernard, "Un accord confidentiel franco-algérien accroît la tension avec les 
étrangers reconduits à la frontière" in Le Monde, 18 October 1994.





























































































My research findings suggest that (A) there is a limited legal basis on which 
international courts can apply human rights to protect non-nationals. (B) Even 
where the Convention provided such a basis, the European Court of Human 
Rights was reluctant to use its judicial capital in a politically explosive dossier. 
They did rule on certain very specific areas such as family life and protection 
against inhuman treatment. (C) Furthermore, the study of the rights of non­
nationals shows that international organizations that seek to diffuse human 
rights norms have had little observable impact on national policies, especially if 
one compares the ways in which national high courts have entered the fray of 
immigration politics and imposed robust norms on the entry and stay of 
foreigners based on constitutional principles that went against the policy goals 
of governments after 1974. (D) The incorporation of European norms varies 
across cases (and time) depending on the national legal culture, namely the 
attitude of judges towards international law, and the activism of public interest 
law organizations. In any case, one cannot say that norms protecting aliens 
uniformly permeate domestic settings.
Notwithstanding, this study should encourage scholars to develop 
process-tracing research designs and working with precise definitions of norms 
and norms-adaptation mechanisms. It would be fruitful in particular to study the 
impact of international norms on other areas of the world, in particular new 
areas of migration such as Southern Europe, Japan, and the Middle East, and 
countries that are illiberal or have a weak judiciary. Organizational sociologists 
deem the diffusion of norms to be a global phenomenon and this would be a 
way to complement a study in countries that are “most likely cases.” The 
findings presented here suggest that, even in regions where the web of human 
rights institutions is dense, there is less pervasiveness of principled beliefs than 
what the sociology literature on global norms suggests.
International law-making is a slow yet unending process so the end of the 
story has yet to be written. The era of human rights standards-setting is perhaps 
over in Europe yet the jurisprudence of the ECHR and the ECJ may yet evolve. 
The present decade is marked by rights rerenchment rather than of rights 
granting and consolidation as were the 1970s and 1980s, in particular in the 
case of non-(EU)nationals. In this context, perhaps European courts along with 
their national counterparts may play an accrued role as guarantors of norms 






























































































Yet, one cannot overlook the fact that national governments that seek to 
enhance the effectiveness of their migration control policy have adapted to the 
important role of national courts and more minor influence of the ECJ and the 
ECHR. This can be seen by the way they have changed the level at which 
migration control is elaborated and implemented. New control policies include 
“remote control” strategies through the signing of cooperation agreements with 
transit and sending countries, and career liabilities that increases the number of 
potential migrants not allowed to land on European soil, the creation of 
international waiting zones where lawyers and associations have little access to 
migrants that may need to start legal proceedings. Similarly, European 
governments are devolving policy implementation responsibilities to local 
officials such as mayors in a way that goes against the idea of equal rights for 
aliens across a territory.149 State responses to the juridicization of migration 
policy can also be seen in the lack of judicial review in the framework of the 
“third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs” that addresses common immigration 
and asylum issues. At the same time, intergovernmental frameworks of 
cooperation such as Schengen, Trevi and Dublin have fostered the creation of 
networks of civil servants and police officials whose dealings are secretive and 
are not the object of judicial, or legislative oversight.150 In brief, there are a 
number of hindrances to the emergence of a strong international regime 
protecting the rights of non-nationals and it also faces the challenge of adaptive 
nation-states as it develops.
149 On these two last points, see Guiraudon and Lahav 1997, and Guiraudon 1998b.
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